PAKISTAN LEAKS

A.Q. Khan's 'secret agreement'

Cable reveals the conditions brokered by a Pakistan court between him and the government for his freedom'

In return for his “freedom” from de facto house arrest in 2009, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb who was accused of running a proliferation ring, agreed with the Pakistan government to a stringent set of conditions that restricted his movement and curtailed his interactions, ensuring that his release remained by and large symbolic.

The conditions, never publicised before but much speculated about as they were ordered to be kept secret by a court in Pakistan, are contained in a U.S. diplomatic cable. Obtained by The Hindu through WikiLeaks, the cable also reports Pakistan Interior Secretary Kamal Shah assuring the U.S. Ambassador that the court decision provided legal cover to the government in dealing with the disgraced scientist, as his previous detention had no legal basis.

The document reveals the Pakistan People's Party-led government's tight-rope walk between domestic public sentiment that revered Dr. Khan as a national hero and wanted him freed, and U.S. and international pressure not to release him.

Dr. Khan was placed under virtual house arrest by President Pervez Musharraf in 2004 after his confession on national television that he had sold nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea. The confession followed U.S. investigations into what is now known as “the A.Q. Khan network.” Dr. Khan later retracted the confession and said he had been forced to make it.

After President Musharraf stepped down in August 2008, the Bhopal-born Pakistan scientist moved the Islamabad High Court for his release. By then, the PPP government, which had been elected to power just months earlier, was already under tremendous pressure to release him.

Ministers made conflicting statements as they tried to satisfy, on the one hand, public opinion at home, and on the other, the international nuclear order that still held the 75-year-old to be a proliferation risk. As a WikiLeaks cable published last year revealed, the U.S, in particular, conveyed to Pakistan that he should not be released.

In February 2009, the court declared Dr. Khan a “free citizen,” but only after it had brokered a “secret agreement” between him and the government. The court prohibited either side from making the details public.

According to a U.S. diplomatic cable dated February 7, 2009, on the day of the court's order, Interior Secretary Kamal Shah provided U.S. Ambassador Anne W. Patterson a copy of Annexure ‘A' to the one-page order, detailing the agreement (190946: secret). Dr. Khan accepted, among other conditions, that he would not request any visits to any “strategic organisations or their subsidiaries.” He would not call any person working in those organisations for a meeting “without the prior permission of the Authorities.” He would inform the authorities of any visit to outstation destinations “48/24 hours in advance.” And in case Karachi was his destination, such information would be given “03/02 days prior to planned movement.”

Guest lists to functions at his home, a restaurant or a hotel “must be cleared by local security staff amicably,” but foreigners were not allowed. Nor would he be allowed to travel abroad.

He was ordered by the court to keep his movements “secret and avoid visits to public places.”

Then there were certain conditions that Dr. Khan did not accept. These the court said it was ordering “in view of the peculiar nature of the case, its international ramifications and considering all surrounding circumstances.” He “shall join the pending inquiry/investigation on proliferation, as and when required by competent officials;” return “any material or document etc. on Pakistan's nuclear program, if any, in his control;” refrain from “exploiting specific media personnel to influence public opinion on various national/international issues without Government clearance;” refrain “from indulging in any political activities and high profile socialization, whatsoever.”

The cable reports Interior Secretary Kamal Shah as assuring the Ambassador “that the Government of Pakistan retains full powers to ensure that Khan remains under tight control.” Describing the house arrest from 2004 until then as “extrajudicial,” Mr. Shah said the court's decision gave the government “legal cover.” He expressed the hope that “the terms of the court decision would reassure the international community, especially the U.S., that Khan remained neutralized as a potential proliferation threat.”

Within minutes of the court pronouncing him a “free citizen,” Dr. Khan had held an impromptu press conference outside his plush E-7 villa in Islamabad. Mr. Shah expressed regret to Ms. Patterson “that Khan had been able to make comments to the press, but told the Ambassador that the impromptu press conference outside of Khan's home had been conducted prior to the formal release of the court's decision and had thus caught the law enforcement agencies unprepared.”

190946: Interior Secretary provides terms of A.Q. Khan's modified detention

S.M. Zafar, Khan's prominent and highly respected lawyer, had pledged to the government that the meeting with the press would be Khan's "first and last" such encounter.

190946 2/7/2009 3:33:00 PM 09ISLAMABAD280 Embassy Islamabad SECRET 09ISLAMABAD267 VZCZCXRO5581PP RUEHLH RUEHPWDE RUEHIL #0280/01 0381533ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 071533Z FEB 09FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABADTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1388INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9789RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9614RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4415RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1029RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6726RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5650RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITYRUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0107RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000280 SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2034 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PARM, KNNP, PK SUBJECT: INTERIOR SECRETARY PROVIDES TERMS OF A.Q. KHAN'S MODIFIED DETENTION

REF: ISLAMABAD 267

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) Secretary of the Interior Kamal Shah called in the Ambassador on February 7 to provide a copy of "Annexure-A", the terms of the Islamabad High Court,s decision on Khan,s appeal of his detention (text below). Shah assured the Ambassador that the Government of Pakistan retains full powers to ensure that Khan remains under tight control. The court,s decision, Shah argued, provides legal cover for the government, whose prior detention of Khan under house arrest had been extrajudicial. He expressed the hope that the terms of the court decision would reassure the international community, especially the U.S., that Khan remained neutralized as a potential proliferation threat.

2. (S) Shah expressed regret that Khan had been able to make comments to the press, but told the Ambassador that the impromptu press conference outside of Khan,s home had been conducted prior to the formal release of the court,s decision and had thus caught the law enforcement agencies unprepared. He noted that President Zardari had been extremely upset when he heard that Khan had been able to speak to the press. S.M. Zafar, Khan,s prominent and highly respected lawyer, had pledged to the government afterwards, however, that the meeting with the press would be Khan's "first and last" such encounter.

3. (S) In regard to the terms of the court decision, Shah said that Khan had accepted all terms except two or three, which had then been ordered by the court.

4. (S) Following is the text of "Annexure-A", which is under seal by the court:

W.P. No. 1503 of 2008

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan versus Government of Pakistan

After arguing the matter at some length, the respondent No. 1 has offered the following terms and conditions which the petitioner has accepted:

a. No visit to strategic organizations or their subsidiaries, as determined by the authorities, shall be requested by Dr. A.Q. Khan.

b. Dr. A.Q. Khan shall not call any person from the strategic organizations for a meeting without prior permission of the authorities. Doctors/staff/facilities of KRL Hospital will, however, continue to be available as per existing practice.

c. While planning a visit to out stations, the authorities shall be informed 48/24 hours in advance enabling the authorities to take necessary security steps at the destination and during transit. In case of Karachi, the information would be provided 03/02 days prior to planned movement.

d. While arranging social functions at home, restaurants and hotels, the invitees and the venue must be cleared with the local security staff amicably. Dr. Khan will not invite any foreigner. Anybody who could be detrimental to his security will also not be invited.

e. Interaction through any means including electronic methods with Pakistanis or foreigners who were debriefed/suspected of nuclear proliferation shall not be requested/undertaken.

f. Foreign visits shall not be requested.

g. The level of the security inside and outside his residence and during any movement, visible and invisible, shall ensure his personal security.

h. That the movement of Dr. A.Q. Khan in Islamabad shall be subject to conditions defined and agreed at paragraphs c and g above.

ISLAMABAD 00000280 002 OF 002

In view of the above, this Court feels that Dr. Khan needs a foolproof security plan and none can afford any lapse in this regard. It is, therefore, ordered that the following measures should also be put in place by the Government for Dr. Khan,s security:

a. The petitioner must keep his movements secret and avoid visits to public places.

b. The Secretary Interior Division will depute an officer of the rank of Grade 18/19, who shall be responsible for the security of the petitioner. The said officer shall advise the petitioner regularly about the risks involved in his visit to a particular place and the petitioner shall act upon such advice in view of his own safety and well-being.

c. The said officer shall be bound to inform this court about the compliance of the orders of this Court by both the parties including the well being and safety of the petitioner on a quarterly basis.

d. The said officer shall report to this court about any extra security requirement in addition to above security. However, in view of the peculiar nature of the case, its international ramifications and considering all surrounding circumstances, the court further orders:

a. That Dr. Khan shall join the pending inquiry/investigation on proliferation, as and when required by competent officials. He is also directed to return any material or document etc. on Pakistan,s nuclear program, if any, in his control.

b. Dr. Khan should refrain from exploiting specific media personnel to influence public opinion on various national/international issues without Government clearance.

c. Dr. Khan should refrain from indulging in any political activities and high profile socialization, whatsoever.

Dr. Khan shall thus have liberty in lieu of his services rendered but within the framework mentioned in the aforementioned paras.

The writ petition is thus disposed of in the above terms.

End text.

5. (S) Comment: Despite the government,s protestations to the contrary, the court order clearly provides Khan with significantly greater freedom than has been the case until now, although his freedoms of movement and association remain heavily circumscribed. It remains to be seen, of course, how strictly the government will demand that Khan abide by the terms of the court order. The government, particularly President Zardari, seemed surprised at the timing of the court's decision and he was particularly mindful of how this will be received by the international community. As noted in reftel, Khan remains a hero in the eyes of most Pakistanis, and the manner in which news of the decision leaked out on February 6, along with Khan,s appearance in the press, will have raised popular expectations that he will be free to lead a more-or-less normal life. PATTERSON

Pak helped North Korea build nuke weapons as early as 1990: report

North Korea, with the help of Pakistan, may have opened an alternative way to clandestinely build nuclear weapons as early as 1990s by constructing a plant to manufacture a gas needed for uranium enrichment.

Pyongyang may have been enriching uranium on a small scale by 2002, with maybe 3,000 or even more centrifuges and Pakistani supplied vital machinery, drawings and technical advice, The Washington Post has reported citing an account by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb programme.

The Post quoting a US intelligence official said Khan’s information adds to their suspicions that North Korea has long pursued the enrichment of uranium in addition to making plutonium for bombs.

The paper quoted the Pakistani scientist as saying that there was tacit agreement between the two governments that his laboratory “would advice and guide them with a centrifuge programme and that the North Koreans would help Pakistan in fitting the nuclear warhead into the Ghauri missile“.

The paper quoted Dr. Khan as saying that during his visit to North Korea in 1999, he was taken to a mountain tunnel, where his source had showed him components of three finished nuclear warheads.

Pakistan's military officers, seen through American eyes

The cable shows that anti-American biases run deep in the military, despite the lavish bankrolling by the U.S.

The 9/11 attack was a Jewish conspiracy, the CIA runs the American media, MI-5 runs the BBC: commonplace conspiracy theories on the Internet and, as a U.S. military officer found out while he attended a course at one of Pakistan's premier military education institutes, common too among senior officers of the Pakistan military.

As the United States tries to “reset” its relationship with Pakistan and especially the country's powerful military, a May 12, 2008 U.S. Embassy cable from Islamabad about Colonel Michael Schleicher's experiences at the National Defence University (153436: confidential) shows that it is going to be a mostly uphill task.

The cable, a report of Colonel Schleicher's “perceptions of the course, his classmates and his instructors” as told to the Embassy's Political Officer, is a primer on the different universes that the U.S. and Pakistan inhabit; it shows that anti-American biases run deep in the military, despite the lavish bankrolling by the U.S.

Sent under the signature of U.S. Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, the cable concludes that the best way to correct this is to increase opportunities for Pakistani military officers to train in the U.S, and to “consider an exchange program of instructors to broaden understanding of the U.S.”

Located in Islamabad, the National Defence University's stated mission is “to impart higher education policy and strategy formulation at various tiers with emphasis on national security and defence, and act as a national think tank.” Among its students are high-calibre military officers.

Col. Schleicher attended the NDU senior course, for students at the colonel and brigadier ranks; the junior course draws officers of the lieutenant colonel and colonel ranks.

The American officer inferred — on the basis of his professional and personal interactions — that at least two-thirds of his Pakistani batch-mates were either “religiously devout” or “moderately religious.”

According to him, less than a third of his class was “overtly secular,” and only two openly drank alcohol. Consumption of liquor by Muslims is prohibited in Pakistan.

In her comment on the contents of the cable, the Ambassador noted that with Washington's support, Post was working to dramatically increase International Military Education and Training (IMET) opportunities for officers and NCOs.

EXCHANGE PROGRAMME

The cable quoted her as saying:

“We need, in particular, to target the ‘lost generation' of Pakistan military who missed IMET opportunities during the sanctions years. The elite of this crop of colonels and brigadiers are receiving biased NDU training with no chance to hear alternative views of the US.

“Given the bias of the instructors, we also believe it would be beneficial to initiate an exchange program for instructors.”

The cable did not elaborate on what basis the U.S. officer had assessed the religious bent of mind of his Pakistani counterparts. It merely said: “Col. Schleicher believed the secular students felt peer pressure to appear more religious than they actually were.”

The mission statement of the NDU says its aim is to impact higher education in policy and strategic affairs at various tiers on national security and defence and act as a national think tank. Headed by a three-star General, the University offers two courses.

In the year the U.S. officer attended it, the senior course included 135 classmates. Of these, approximately 25 were military officers from Pakistan's allies (including the U.S., Britain, and China).

The curriculum included lessons on classic nation-state development, which includes the use of Islamic texts, Pakistan's foundational documents — such as the works of Mohammad Ali Jinnah that discuss why Pakistan was created and how its legacy should impact its future policies.

There were two women in the course, including one from the faculty. During all trips and visits, the separation of men and women was strictly observed.

MISPERCEPTIONS

The American officer was of the view that his Pakistani batchmates had several “misconceptions” about the U.S. In contrast, they approved everything Chinese.

The cable said that even the course instructors often had misperceptions about U.S. policies and culture, and infused their lectures with these suspicions.

“For example, one guest lecturer — who is a Pakistani one-star general — claimed the U.S. National Security Agency actively trains correspondents for media organisations. Some students share these misconceptions despite having children who attended universities in the US or London.”

The cable said that some of those who were doing the course did not believe that the U.S. deployed women pilots overseas. A few of them believed that the Central Intelligence Agency was in charge of the U.S. media (and that the British intelligence agency MI-5 was in charge of the British Broadcasting Corporation).

“Students in the Junior Course shared many of the biases prevalent in the Muslim world, including a belief the US invaded Iraq for its oil and that 9/11 was a staged ‘Jewish conspiracy'.”

The Pakistani students appeared to come from wealthy families or from military families and were proud of the fact that they received amenities, including private-quality schools and good health care, as an incentive to stay in the military.

“Officers at the brigadier rank touted their privileges, including a house, car, and a driver. The NDU students also obtained financial perks, such as a free trip for a pilgrimage that could be taken at the end of the class.”

The Pakistan Cables are being shared by The Hindu with NDTV in India and Dawn in Pakistan.

‘Mumbai attackers left clues despite full-proof plan’

While the LeT leadership made plans for full-proof attacks in Mumbai, the ten men involved in the carnage made a number of mistakes thus leaving crucial clues behind for Indian intelligence agencies, according to court documents.

These mistakes were conceded by the LeT mastermind Sajid Mir in multiple conversations with the David Coleman Headley, the Mumbai attacks co-accused, unsealed court documents said on Wednesday.

“Sajid told Headley that, despite news reports, there were only 10 attackers. He explained to Headley how Abu Qahafa, senior LeT member, had trained the attackers on use of explosives and how he (Sajid) had instructed them to place explosives in cabs to cause confusion amongst Indian officials responding to the attacks,” it said.

According to the court documents, in a later meeting with Sajid, he related to Headley that certain attackers had not followed his instructions, and had failed to sink the boat that was hijacked for their ingress to Mumbai. Sajid related that one of the attackers mistakenly left on this boat a satellite phone that had been provided to him.

“Indian authorities located this boat, recovered this phone, and provided it to the FBI for forensic analysis.

Stored in the phone’s contacts were two numbers identified as ‘Wasi.’ The phone had been used to contact ‘Wasi’ on November 24, 2008, and had recovered a call from ‘Wasi’ on November 25, 2008,” the documents said.

The documents were released after the District court conducting the Mumbai attack trial ordered that some of the over dozen sealed documents presented in the court as key evidences is made public.

“Sajid also told Headley that one of the attackers had been arrested and that he had tried to free the attacker by instructing an attacker at the Chabad House to contact the Israeli embassy and attempt to trade hostages for the attacker,” the documents said.

According to the documents, Sajid explained that he had chosen the Leopold Cafe as an attack location because it was close to the Taj Mahal hotel and had instructed the attackers to move to the hotel after attacking the cafe.

Headley and Sajid continued to communicate by email throughout parts of 2009. On July 3, 2009, Headley received an email from Sajid, who told Headley that he wanted to speak with him about ‘some new investment plans’, a coded reference to the planning of another terrorist attack.

On July 8, 2009, Headley sent an email to Sajid that stated, in part, “[y]ou were saying all plans were ‘postponed indefinitely’ anyway so I thought maybe I should relax a bit,” Sajid responded, indicating in part that his plans were to “see Rahul”, which was a coded reference to India, and that “matters are good enough to move forward.”

Headley and Sajid continued to exchange emails throughout July 2009, with Headley asking whether the “Northern Project”, another code for the planning of the Denmark attack, was still postponed and whether the “visit to Rahul’s place” [India] was for “checking out real estate property like before”, referring to Headley’s earlier surveillance activity in Mumbai, the documents said.

Documents in U.S. v. Rana case

The trial documents pertaining to United States of America versus Tahawwur Rana in Chicago have been made available by the United States Department of Justice at the following link:

http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/hot/us_v_rana.html

‘LeT handlers guided attackers watching Mumbai attack on TV'

Watching the 2008 Mumbai carnage live on TV from Pakistan, terror outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) handlers guided the attackers on phone and even asked them to change tactics to challenge the advancing commandos.

The strategy followed during the 60-hour siege of Mumbai emerged during the testimony of the 26/11 co-accused David Headley in a Chicago District Court on the third day of the trial of his childhood friend and Pakistani-Canadian Tawahhur Rana.

Rana has been slapped with a dozen charges in connection with the November 2008 attack in which 166 persons were killed, while Headley, a Pakistani-American and a star prosecution witness, has pleaded guilty.

Headley told the court that his LeT handler Sajid Mir was in Karachi during the Mumbai attack. Sajid Mir told Headley that a couple of people were with him. Sajid Mir was in contact with the attackers via phone and he was watching TV coverage of the siege and seeing what was going on in India, he said.

Sajid Mir was praised by Rana for his Chhabad House attack strategy and even called him Khalid bin Walid, one of the greatest Generals in history, Headley testified.

About the operation at Chhabad House in Mumbai, Headley said, Sajid Mir told the two boys (attackers) to use mattresses and ambush the Special Forces personnel, who were descending down the staircases. Six people were killed in the attack on Chhabad house, a Jewish community centre.

Headley also said he told Sajid Mir that he has received a compliment from Rana for his “tactical brilliance.”

Headley also said that Rana sent a message for him from Major Iqbal, who was his ISI handler. This was before he took the last trip to Mumbai for surveillance ahead of the attacks.

Headley said Sajid Mir expressed his frustration that he did not follow all his instructions — one was “I was not suppose to go back to India after the Mumbai attack and travel to Denmark.”

Headley told Rana his four targets were Somnath — an ancient temple in Gujarat, Bollywood (the Indian movie industry) the Shiv Sena and the Jyllands Posten, the Danish newspaper which published the controversial cartoons of Prophet Mohammed.

On his discussion with Rana, Headley said, “Rana told me to stop doing what I was doing and he was offering me a job at his farm.”

U.S. worried Pakistan was misusing war funds

Of concern were claims relating to helicopter operations, radar maintenance and Joint Staff operations.

The United States Embassy in Islamabad was extremely concerned about the misappropriation of money given to Pakistan as reimbursement of costs of fighting terrorist outfits such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

A number of cables sent between 2007 and 2009 to Washington by U.S. Ambassador Anne W. Patterson called for a thoroughgoing review of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), set up by the U.S. after the 9/11 attack to reimburse its key allies the costs of providing assistance in the ‘global war on terror.' The cables suggested that money given for providing logistical, military and other support to U.S. military operations were “diverted” and that reimbursement claims made by Pakistan's military were “seriously inflated.”

In a wire (114010: confidential) dated July 2, 2007, Ms. Patterson stated that the Embassy has increasingly engaged the Pakistan government to ensure that CSF reimbursements were “reasonable and credible.” She mentioned that the “areas of greatest concern” were Pakistan's claims relating to helicopter operations ($83 million annually), radar maintenance ($65 million annually) and Joint Staff operations ($5 million annually). She added: “We are also seeking confirmation of the location of bunkers constructed ($35 million) and roads built ($20 million) since July 2006, and we have requested answers to anomalies in the cost of rations, flak vests and accommodations maintenance.”

A cable (223755: confidential) sent on September 4, 2007, recorded Ms. Patterson telling Pakistan Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin that a $500 million CSF transfer that Pakistan was awaiting “could not be disbursed until the Pakistani military had properly accounted for its expenditures.” She drew attention to its “continuing inability to provide receipts.”

The cables were written at a time when the total CSF reimbursements to Pakistan exceeded $6 billion, accounting for 90 per cent of the total funding under the programme worldwide. The fact that the funds were usually channelled into Pakistan's general treasury complicated the problem of identifying their final destination.

Another cable (233602: confidential) dated November 6, 2009, quoted Mr. Tarin as having claimed to have done a detailed analysis. It concluded that of a total of $6.6 billion the U.S. had given Pakistan, only some $250 million had gone to the Pakistan Army: the rest had “gone into the regular budget.” The Finance Minister is said to have stressed that coalition support funds count as income in the budget, thereby “positively affecting the fiscal deficit.”

According to another cable (134295: confidential) sent on December 14, 2007, the two clear areas of misappropriation were helicopter readiness and medical support to the Frontier Corps. Although Pakistan received $55 million for helicopter operations between July 2006 and February 2007, the cable said the Embassy was confident that the Army Aviation Command never received the money.

It recorded that only two to six Cobra helicopters were “fully mission capable” at the time the Pakistan government “desperately need air power to fight spreading militancy.”

Stating that the Pakistan Army had claimed $99 million over the past 12 months for medical operations — a claim that the U.S. had settled or was in the process of settling — the cable stated that “the Frontier Corps still did not receive basic medevac [medical evacuation] support.”

Apart from this, a fully funded $235 million CSF lease assistance was provided for the acquisition of 26 new Bell 412 helicopters; however, the cable noted that “the Inspector General of the Frontier Corps had repeatedly requested U.S. assistance to provide assets for medevac, obviously unaware of the resources the U.S. has provided.

Adding that the $26 million claim for barbed wire and pickets were “highly suspect,” the cable noted that despite repeatedly raising issues relating to CSF disbursement with high-ranking Pakistan officials, including the Prime Minister, the Embassy had “not received satisfactory responses.”

Ms. Patterson listed four “potential options” to address the issue of ensuring that U.S. money was spent on meeting its counter-terrorism objectives.

The first was to “stop approving Pakistan's CSF reimbursement requests until we receive adequate assurances on disbursement” — an option she herself ruled out on the grounds that it would lead to a “major political clash” and damage the U.S.-Pakistan military relationship. The other three options were to earmark CSF money for specific areas, create a CSF “trust fund” that would allow Washington to control reimbursement and to obligate some funds for specific needs, and to convert the CSF into a direct cash transfer programme.

The Pakistan Cables are being shared by The Hindu with NDTV in India and Dawn in Pakistan
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India may approach NY court to prove ISI as terror group
NEW DELHI: India may approach a New Yorkcourt to be a party to a lawsuit, filed by the family of 26/11 victims Rabbi Gavriel Noah Holtzberg and his wife Rivka, to declare Pakistan's spy agency ISIas a terrorist group.

Armed with many documents, which prove the ISI's links with terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, India may implead itself in the lawsuit filed in the federal court to help the petitioners as well as declaring ISI as a terrorist outfit.

"Our main purpose is to help the family of the Rabbi to get justice as well as to prove in the New York court ISI's direct link with terror outfits like LeT which carried out the Mumbai attack," a government official said.

If the New York court is convinced about ISI's role in 26/11 attack, it will strengthen the case of declaring ISI as terrorist outfit by the US and the UN.

In the lawsuit, ISI chief Shuja Pasha and LeT are being sued for the Mumbai attack. It was filed by the close family members of Rabbi Holtzberg and Rivka, who were killed by the terrorists at theChabad House in Mumbai during the 26/11 attack.

The disclosure of LeT operative David Headley in a Chicago court that he was in constant contact with ISI officials and he received espionage training from ISI is also likely to strengthen the lawsuit.

Headley's testimony in the trial of Pakistani-Canadian Tahawwur Rana in a Chicago court that the Pakistani spy agency and its operatives like Major Iqbal and LeT founder Hafiz Saeed had helped him in laying the groundwork for the Mumbai attacks has exposed Islamabad's role in 26/11, the government official said.

Through records of several emails exhibited in the court, federal prosecutors established beyond doubt that Headley was in constant contact with ISI officials, in particular Major Iqbal, and his handlers in Pakistan.

In one of the emails to his ISI handler Major Iqbal, Headley writes about the latest spying gadgets.

Headley told the court that Iqbal made key decisions and was indeed the mastermind of the 26/11 plot.

"Major Iqbal told me the Chabad House would be added on whatever list (of targets) there was because it was a front office for the Mossad" - Israel's intelligence agency, Headley said, adding that Major Iqbal "seemed upset the (Mumbai) airport was not included" as a target.

"If we become party to the law suit, all these will come as great help in proving our point that ISI is nothing but a global terrorist organisation," the official said.